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THE EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS ON
COOPERATIVE PRICING POLICIES AND SUCCESS
Lynn Hunnicutt

ABSTRACT

Cooperatives are unique among agribusiness firms because their owners are also their
customers. This dual nature of patrons means that maximizing profit is one of several optimal
strategies the cooperative may pursue. Using a survey of marketing cooperative managers, we
examine how membership characteristics and cooperative structure influence cooperative
policies. We also study the relationship between member characteristics, cooperative policies
and cooperative success. Longer member planning horizons and independent management make
profit or price maximization more likely. Cooperative success does not appear systematically
related to membership characteristics or cooperative structure. Evidently, cooperative success is
not easily measured or explained.
JEL codes: L120, Q130, L200

Key words: cooperatives, retained earnings, success

THE EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS ON
COOPERATIVE PRICING POLICIES AND SUCCESS*
Introduction
Cooperatives face many challenges in today's agricultural market. They must compete
horizontally with increasingly large investor-owned firms (lOFs) and often must sell their
products in markets where only a few extremely large firms act as buyers. Both processing and
supply cooperatives are called on to make ever larger investments in capital to serve their diverse
member-owners. The size distribution of U.S. farms illustrates the difficulties cooperatives face
in meeting the needs of a diverse membership while making business decisions necessary to
remain competitive. The 1997 Census of Agriculture reports that only 7% of all the farms in the
United States produced over 70% of the value of agricultural products sold in 1997 while
approximately 74% of all the farms in the U.S. produced only about 6.8% of the value of
agricultural products sold the same year. Since many cooperatives need assured supplies to
operate processing facilities efficiently they need to maintain the commitment of large farmers
while still serving the needs of smaller producers.
Cooperatives have been successful because they have met the needs of their
member-owners. In the past these needs were usually geography-specific and cooperatives were
organized to market local products and/or provide agricultural inputs on a local basis. Because
members were located in the same region, they were generally homogeneous and cooperative
policies were easier to specify. As the structure of cooperatives has evolved to larger, less
geographically dependent organizations, interest in issues of member commitment, control and
governance has intensified. The characteristics of owner-members have also changed as
commercial farm size has increased and sophisticated management systems have emerged. This
has resulted in a more diverse (heterogeneous) membership within cooperatives. As a result, the

*Thanks are due to DeeVon Bailey and Carl Gwin for helpful comments, to session participants at the Western
Economic Association annual meeting in Seattle, Washington, and to Jason Jones for outstanding research assistance. This
research was supported in part by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, and by a new faculty research grant from Utah State
University. The usual caveat applies.
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goals of members within a given cooperative may diverge (see Staatz (1987) for a discussion of
the various ways member characteristics can influence cooperative behavior). Understanding the
effect of membership heterogeneity on policy making and control within cooperatives is critical
to learning how to maintain member commitment to cooperatives and to understanding how
cooperative structures can evolve to best address the emerging needs of member-owners.
This study uses a survey of marketing cooperatives to examine the effect of membership
and cooperative characteristics (including member heterogeneity) on the pricing and retained
earnings policies the cooperative pursues, and which characteristic-policy combinations lead to
cooperative success. The study is limited to marketing cooperatives because their membership is
much less diverse than the membership of supply cooperatives. Additionally, there is a
well-developed theory of the pricing objectives that marketing cooperatives may choose to
pursue (Schmiesing (1989)), which lends itself to empirical examination.
In the survey, cooperative managers were asked questions regarding characteristics of the

cooperative's members, its pricing policies and various measures of success. The goal of the
study is to determine which member characteristics influence the cooperative's pricing and
retained earnings policies, and which policy-characteristic combinations lead to cooperative
success. In short, the project's goal is to give some insight into how cooperatives serve their
members, and what leads to cooperative success. This information should thus assist cooperative
managers, as they attempt to steer their cooperatives to a better competitive position.
The discussion that follows comes in three sections. First, a brief review of the many
objectives cooperatives may pursue is given and contrasted with the theory of the
(investor-owned) firm. Second, the survey instrument is described, and empirical models
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developed. Finally, empirical results are presented and some of their implications discussed.
Cooperative Pricing Policies

Schmiesing (1989) illustrates the three pricing policies that a cooperative processor may
pursue. This graph is reproduced here as figure 1. Because total revenue R(q) is given by the
cooperative's demand curve less its processing costs, it is non-linear. This implies that both
average net revenue (ANR) and marginal net revenue (MNR) - revenue net of processing
and other input costs - are first increasing and then decreasing. 1 Similarly, assuming that
members behave as price takers in the input market, the supply (AlC) curve the cooperative faces
will be upward sloping. This implies that the marginal input cost (MIC) curve will also slope
upward, and will be above the supply curve. 2
There are three points of interest in figure 1. If the cooperative managers choose to
maximize the cooperative's profit, they will wish to purchase input until marginal net revenue
equals marginal input cost (qo). This policy gives the largest total revenue available for return to
the members, although this amount need not be returned immediately to the members. Instead of
maximizing the cooperative's profits, the managers may instead chose to purchase input until the
per-unit return to members is largest. This would involve purchasing member output until
average net revenue (the total per-unit amount returned to members) equals marginal net revenue
(qJ). This ensures that members receive the highest per-unit price possible for their goods. It

]As long as the cooperative's average cost curve is U-shaped and its output demand is linear, the average net
revenue curve will first increase then decrease. In a competitive industry at long-TIm equilibrium, the firm's average
total cost will just equal the price it receives for its output. In this case, the $ANR$ curve pictured in figure 1 would
be above the horizontal axis for levels of output for which the price the cooperative receives remains above the
average processing cost.
2The results are valid even if the cooperative faces a perfectly elastic (i.e. horizontal) supply curve.
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also guarantees that the cooperative will have revenues available for return to members, which
~ay

or may not be returned immediately. Finally, the cooperative may choose to maximize the

amount of member output purchased, by purchasing all profitable units of member output. In
this case, it will continue purchasing until average net revenue is equal to average input cost (q2)'
This ensures that the largest amount of member input is purchased, and that the highest initial
price is paid to members, but implies that all payment is made to members when they sell their
output to the cooperative, and that nothing will be returned to them at some later date.
Given these policies, we see that q,<qO<q2' which further implies that the cooperative
offers initial per unit prices of AIC,<AICo<AIC2 • Notice that except when the cooperative is
operating at cost, it will have revenue above the initial price it pays, AICi , to be returned to
members. The total per unit price paid to members can be read from the ANR curve. If members
recognize that the per unit price is higher than initially offered, they will wish to sell more to the
cooperative than it wishes to purchase. Thus, cooperatives maximizing profit or total price must
have some way to limit the amount they purchase from their members.
The unique nature of cooperatives as patron-owned firms makes determining the optimal
pricing policy difficult. Members derive benefits both as owners of the cooperative and as
suppliers to the cooperative. Maximizing cooperative profits limits the amount purchased from
members. This policy benefits the members as owners, but may not be in their best interest as
suppliers. Maximizing the total per-unit price also requires limiting the amount of input the
cooperative purchases, and so may not maximize members' combined revenue from the farm and
the cooperative. Operating at cost ensures that a large amount is purchased, but member revenues
as cooperative owners are driven to zero. Thus, determining which policy best serves members as
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both owners and patrons will depend on member, cooperative and market characteristics.

Member Characteristics and Cooperative Prices
Given the time-value of money, members would, ceteris paribus, prefer income earlier
rather than later, so that a high initial price should be preferred to lower initial price with
additional payment at some later date. This suggests that the cooperative best serves members by
operating at cost. However, some members may have long planning horizons and prefer to invest
in the cooperative in order to generate higher returns in the future. This implies that maximizing
the cooperative's profits and deferring payment of some retains may be desirable. Finally, higher
per unit prices for input are preferred. This implies that members may prefer the cooperative to
maximize the price it pays for its inputs. The characteristics of members influence which of
these preferences dominates, and thus help determine cooperative pricing and retains policies.
One of the major influences on member preferences is the planning horizon of members.
A straightforward way to measure member planning horizon is member age. Since older
members have a shorter time horizon, they are expected to prefer limited retains (Schrader
(1989), Fulton and Adamovicz (1993)). Members in the early stages of their career may also
wish to limit retains, in order to generate the cash flow needed to start up their farms (Royer and
Bhuyan (1993)). Thus, age is expected to have a non-linear relationship to the cooperative's
pricing policy, with the oldest and youngest members preferring operation at cost with limited
retains. Retired member participation is also assumed to shorten the planning horizon of
membership and lead to limited retains. Federated cooperatives (those with other cooperatives as
members) are more likely to have membership with longer planning horizons, as members are
ongoing businesses themselves, rather than individuals (Schrader (1989)). This suggests that
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federated cooperatives are less likely to operate at cost, and more likely to retain some earnings.
For the same reason, cooperatives in which members are able to realize share values (either
through inheritance or sale at market value or because the membership is attached to the farm,
rather than to the individual) should also be able to pursue longer-term strategies, since member
planning horizons will be longer. The presence of tradeable delivery rights is one way for
members to reap any long-term increases in cooperative profitability (Moore and Noel (1995)),
and should thus increase member preferences for profit or total price maximization.
Members who are more committed to the cooperative are likely to be more interested in
its long-term viability. This suggests that cooperatives with committed members will find it
easier to withhold some retains for investment. Fulton and Adamowicz (1993) discusse several
factors influencing member commitment to cooperatives. Among these are the percentage of
input the member marketed through the cooperative, and the percentage of the member's total
income from marketing through the cooperative (which may influence both committment to the
cooperative and member dependence on current income from the cooperative). Wadsworth
(1991) notes that member size (measured by income) may also influence commitment to
cooperatives, with small members less likely to be committed to the cooperative. Cooperatives
with fewer and/or larger (especially corporate) members may enjoy higher member commitment,
since each member gains a larger share of its investment. Small numbers facilitates collusion
between members in the pursuit of longer-term strategies, since the gains per member are much
larger, and since free riding (obtaining the benefits the cooperative confers without investing in
its success) is much easier to detect with fewer members. Finally, we hypothesize that founding
members and those who have patronized the cooperative for many years may be more committed
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to the cooperative. Again, cooperatives with more committed members should be better able to
pursue strategies involving positive retains, while those with less committed members are more
likely to operate at cost.
Bremmers and Zuurbier (1999) study the effect of cooperative structure on member
commitment to cooperatives in the dairy industry of the Netherlands. They find that commitment
to the cooperative diminishes as membership grows and becomes more geographically dispersed.
This suggests that members of large and dispersed cooperatives are more likely to prefer a large
initial payment, and that these cooperatives are more likely to operate at cost. On the other hand,
as cooperatives expand geographically, especially through mergers (as has occurred in the US
dairy industry), local issues become more diluted and cooperative managers may be freed to
address issues related to broad markets at the expense of member loyalty. Especially in large
federated cooperatives, managers may not always choose to maximize member welfare (Fulton
(1989)). Thus, an argument can be made that larger cooperatives are more likely to pursue
longer-term profit or price maximizing strategies.
Finally, if the cooperative has a large degree of control over its members, we might
expect to see managers maximizing (and retaining a large percentage of) the cooperative's profits.
Possible measures of the degree of control a cooperative has over its members include the
percentage of business the cooperative does with non-members, the status of membership
(managers of increasing membership or closed cooperatives have more control) the ability of
cooperative managers to expel or impose financial penalties on members, restrictions on voting
in cooperative elections, and a requirement tying investment to delivery rights. Additionally,
managers of larger, older cooperatives are more likely to be independent in their choice of
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pricing policy (Hind (1997)).
To test the relationship between these four categories (member age and committment to
the cooperative, cooperative structure and control of members) and the pricing/retains policy the
cooperative pursues, the following estimating equation is posited:

POliCYi

a + /31 age + /32patronage + /33mbrinc + /34misrc
+/3sretvote + 1coopage + 02mbrno + 03 coopsale
+04federated + 0sgrowth + 06tdr + 07 mg tpenal

=

+08 mg tex

Where

/3' s

°
+°
9

(1)

voting + 0lOtiedright + 0llPctnmbr + &

give the influence of member characteristics (and indirectly of member

commitment to the cooperative) and 0' s give the effect of the cooperative's structure and
relative strength of bargaining position vis a vis members. A description of each regressor as
well as its influence on pricing/retains policies is given in table 1.
Cooperatives with a good fit between member characteristics and pricing policy are more
likely to be successful than those without such a match. Katz (1997) suggests that successful
cooperatives focus on a narrowly defined mission, avoid major investments in new technology,
and have only limited differentiation. This implies that small, single-product cooperatives may be
most successful. While Katz does not consider membership characteristics the combination of
characteristics and pricing policy may be used to predict cooperative success. To examine the
effects of membership-policy combinations on success, summary statistics are calculated for
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various policy-characteristic combinations. We then create our second estimating equation,
which combines pricing policy and membership characteristics to explain cooperative success.
Membership characteristics are included, as they may influence success independent of the
influence they have on the cooperative's pricing policy.

success j == a + /31 age + /32patronage + /33mbrinc + /34misrc
+ /3sretvote + 6]coopage + 6 4federated + 6 sgrowth
+66tdr + 6 7 mgtpenal + 6 8mgtex + 69 voting
~

+6lO tiedright + 6 11 Pctnmbr + OJ policy +

(2)

3

2:

PmDm

+&

m=1

/3' sand 8' s

Where

are as before, OJ gives the influence of cooperative policy on success,

~

policy is the fitted value from equation (1) and Dm are dummies controlling for the industry in
which the cooperative operates (with wool serving as the base).
Measuring cooperative success turns out to be problematic. Katz (1997) claims that
market-based n1easures are not appropriate, and uses the average product of labor as the measure.
However, he notes that labor productivity is highly correlated with measures such as return on
assets or return on equity. Because the number of cooperatives providing this financial
information is limited, alternative measures of success (both self-reported and objective) are used
as dependent variables in equation (2).
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Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in the regressions. It also describes the
pricing policies that cooperatives may pursue, as well as various measures of success. The
expected effect of each of the independent variables on pricing policy is also indicated.
(Insert Table 1 here)
The Survey

Data were gathered using a survey of managers of processing cooperatives in four
agricultural industries. Before mailing, the survey was pre-tested through interviews with
cooperative managers in Utah. Once the suggested changes were made, the survey was sent to
553 cooperative managers throughout the United States. The sample was selected from the
Directory of Farmer Cooperatives (USDA RES , 1999). In order to increase the probability of
surveying mainly marketing cooperatives, the survey was limited to cooperatives listing wool,
fruits and vegetables, cotton and milk as their main products. This information was verified in
the survey instrument by asking the cooperatives to list their main products.
The survey asked questions regarding the characteristics of the cooperative's members
and the pricing strategies the cooperative followed. Managers were asked basic questions about
how many members the cooperative had, how long the cooperative had been operating, what
sales were in the last fiscal year, what share of (U.S.) industry output they handled and if there
had been any structural change to the cooperative within the last five years. They were also
asked to rate their cooperative's profitability, stability and member satisfaction on a scale of one
to five. Member characteristic questions included the average income, age and length of
membership as well as the cooperative's menlbership type (individual farmers , other cooperatives
or a mix of the two). The survey also included questions designed to measure the degree of
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freedom the cooperative had to set its own policies, by asking whether management can expel or
impose monetary penalties on members, and which members are allowed to vote in cooperative
elections. In addition to a direct question regarding pricing policy, the questionnaire asked about
the cooperative's retains policy, if such policy existed. Finally, in order to assess the financial
position of each cooperative, the survey asked for basic accounting ratios.
The survey was mailed out in March, 2002, using Dillman's total design method (Dillman
(1978)). A postcard was sent two weeks after the initial survey, and a second survey was sent to
non-respondents three weeks after that. Second mailings were also sent to those cooperatives
with missing or incomplete data. 172 surveys were returned for a response rate of 31 %. Of
these, 145 contained useable data and are included in our sample. The unused responses were
mainly notes informing us that the cooperative was out of business (13), was not a marketing
cooperative (12), or that the manager did not wish to answer (2). Six questionnaires were
returned as undeliverable.
Of our responses, 12% marketed wool, 30% marketed fruit and/or vegetables, 21 %
marketed cotton, and 37% marketed milk. The majority of useable responses came from
California (24) followed by New York and Texas, both with 20 responses each. The majority of
cooperatives from California marketed produce, while New York rerespondents mainly marketed
milk, and Texas respondents all marketed cotton. The geographic dispersion of respondents was
fairly good, with 31 % coming from the West (WA, OR, MT, ill, WY, NY, CA, CO, UT, AK,
HI), 18% from the Southwest (AZ, NM, TX, OK), 17% from the Midwest (IL, IN, MI, MO, OH,
MN, SD, ND, NE, KS, IA, WI), 23% from the Northeast (ME, VT, NH, MD, DE, CT, MA, NJ,
NY, PA, RI) and 10% from the Southeast (LA, AR, MS, KY, WV, V A, NC, SC, GA, AL, FL,
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TN). Summary statistics for other questions are included in column 3 of Table 1.
The majority of cooperatives in our sample were small and centralized (membership
consisted of individual farms, rather than other cooperatives). Over half made sales of less than
\$5 million during their last fiscal year, and half had 69 or fewer members (the smallest
respondent had 3 members). However, there are a few extremely large cooperatives (two
respondents had 25,000 members) in the sample. Cooperatives range in age from 3 years old to
137 years old, and most have steady or decreasing membership.
Most members receive a relatively small amount of income from the cooperative. This
cannot tell us whether members have off-farm income, however, and therefore does not directly
correlate with the income distribution of members. Most members have patronized the
cooperative for less than 20 years, which in some cases may be the entire length of time the
cooperative has been in existence. Well over half of respondent cooperatives (93) have been in
existence for 40 years or more, however.
Cooperative management has limited control over their members, as the majority of
managers cannot expel or impose a monetary penalty on members. However, two-thirds of
respondents require members to be present to vote, and over 80 percent do not allow retired
members to vote. Slightly less than half of the sample (42%) offers a competitive initial price,
with median retained earnings, consistent with cooperative profit maximization. Approximately
21 % of respondents operate at cost, while 350/0 never take possession of member products.
Approximately half (70) of respondents have an equity redemption plan in place, with revolving
fund being by far the most popular.
As expected, most cooperative managers report a high degree of success in profitability,
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stability and member satisfaction. The results are more mixed in indirect measures. Over half of
respondents have not expanded in existing or new areas in the past five years, although most
respondents have not shrunk during this period. This presents a picture of fairly stable operations
among respondents in our sample.

Estimation and results
A binary policy variable was first created, coding policies which involved substantial
retained earnings (maximizing profit and maximizing input prices) as one, and those which
involved relatively little retained earnings (operating at cost, and paying members upon sale of
the product) as zero. Given that very few cooperatives reported a low initial price with high
retains (the pricing policy consistent with per-unit price maximization), using this new variable
causes little information to be lost, while still enabling us to distinguish between longer and
shorter-term strategies pursued by cooperatives. The new variable (retstrat) was then regressed
on the regressors listed in (1), using a probit specification.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Initial parameter estimates are given in Column 1 of Table 2, with marginal effects
reported in column 2. Significant predictors of the retained earnings policy the cooperative
pursued include the percentage of young members (page20), the type of membership (federate),
the presence of tradeable delivery rights (tdr), the source of member income (misrc), changes in
membership (growth), the number of members in the cooperative (mbrno), the size of the
cooperative's sales (coopsale), and the presence of delivery rights tied to investment (tiedright).
Of these, tdr, mbrno and tiedright are positive. Cooperatives with large numbers of members
with delivery rights tied to investment and tradeable delivery rights are more likely to pursue a
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longer-tenn policy of maximizing profit or total price paid to members, rather than operating at
cost. The negative sign on growth tells us that cooperatives with closed or increasing
membership (coded as zero) are more likely to have retained earnings than those with steady or
decreasing membership (coded as one). We see that member planning horizon (tdr) , cooperative
structure (mbrno), and cooperative control over members (mbrstrur, tiedright) tend to enable the
cooperative to pursue longer-tenn pricinglretains policies. Cooperatives with younger members
(page20) or members who receive the majority of their income from the cooperative (misrc) are
less likely to retain earnings. As anticipated, members in the early stages of their career or who
depend on the cooperative for a large percentage of their income tend to be associated with
cooperatives with shorter-tenn strategies. We also see that centralized cooperatives (federate) are
more likely to have retained earnings. This may be because members of centralized cooperatives
are more committed to the cooperative.
Contrary to our prediction, larger cooperative sales decrease the likelihood of retained
earnings. To examine this issue further, dummy variables were included for every level of
cooperative sales in the regression reported in column 3 of Table 2. With this modification, none
of the levels of coopsales remain significant. This suggests that treating this categorical variable
in a continuous manner (as was done in the first regression) may be problematic. All previously
significant variables remain significant and have the same sign (tdr becomes marginally
insignificant with a p-value of 0.11). Once again, this supports the predictions made above. In
addition to these variables, mgtex, a dummy variable for the management's right to expel
members, and pctl J 0 the percentage of members who have belonged to the cooperative for ten
years or less. These last two significant variables tell us that when management has the right to
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expel members (mgtex), the cooperative is likely to pursue longer-term strategies. Member
commitment among new members (pctllO) is likely higher, so that these cooperatives are more
likely to retain earnings for longer-term goals.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Table 3 describes the relationship between cooperative pricing policies and various
success measures. Looking at the bottom, we see that cooperatives which have limited retained
earnings also have higher average and median sales per member. When looking at individual
pricing strategies, we see that cooperatives that operate at cost (high initial price, limited retains)
have much larger average sales per member than all others, and that cooperatives which pay
members upon sale of their output have much larger median sales per member. It appears that
cooperatives which pay competitive or low initial prices also have lower sales per member.
Looking at the three alternative success measures presented in Table 3, we see that
cooperatives with some level of retained earnings are also more likely to expand into new areas.
Expanding in existing areas is much more common, as approximately half of all respondents
have done so, while only a third of cooperatives have expanded into new areas. Few of the
respondents have reduced their workforce in the past five years.

-

Next, we included the fitted policy variable (pstrat ) into regressions with various

measures of cooperative success as the dependent variable. 3 Although several dependent
variables were used, none of these models fit the data well, so results will not be reported here,

3Identification of the regression equation may be problematic when a fitted variable is included on the
right-hand-side with some of its explanatory variables. To overcome this problem, dummies were added to account
for industry effect, and ensure that the success regressions were identified. Additionally, results for all success
regressions change little when $%\widehat{pstrat}$ is omitted.
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although they are available upon request. The first dependent variable tried was sales per
member. The only significant predictor of cooperative success is the percentage of members who
have belonged to the cooperative for a long time (pct3140). In addition to insignificant
regressors, the model is not a good predictor, as the F-test for model fit was not significant.
Because the first regression model seemed to fit the data poorly, regressions involving
other success measures were performed. We next tried regressing three self-reported success
measures on explanatory variables including fitted pricing policy. Dependent variables were the
manager's report on how well the cooperative met its profitability goals (profit), how financially
stable the cooperative was (stable) and how content members were with management (content).
Not surprisingly, all three of these models are significant, and a significant relationship is found
between some of the regressors and the dependent variable. The presence of tradeable delivery
rights appears to increase the manager's belief in the cooperative's profitabiliy, while weakened

-

management (mgtpenal) and a policy of limited retains ( pstrat ) increases the manager's

perception of the cooperative's financial stability.
Regressing self-reported variables on self-reported variables may be suspect, so three
additional indirect success measures were also tried as dependent variables. These three
dependent variables measure whether the cooperative has expanded in existing areas (expand) ,
whether the cooperative has entered new areas (newarea), or permanently reduced its workforce
(redempno) in the last five years. While these models give a slightly better fit, none of the

log-likelihood tests is significant. Very few variables in any of these three regressions were
significant. Cooperatives which tie delivery rights to investment (tiedright) are less likely to
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have reduced their workforce in the past five years. This is not surprising, as these cooperatives
have an ongoing source of funding, and are thus better equipped to maintain a steady workforce.
Finally, regressions using financial measures of success (return on assets and return on
member equity) were considered. Many respondents did not include this data, and not enough
observations were available to provide the necessary degrees of freedom to estimate the models.
Overall, the models explaining cooperative success are less compelling than those
explaining the cooperative's pricing/retains strategy. While disappointing, the number and
variety of measures used without significant results suggests that the regressors available in this
data set may simply not be the key detenninants of cooperative success. This leads one to
wonder - if these variables are not related to cooperative success, what is? Alternatively, it may
be that, as suggested by Katz (1997), cooperative success is difficult to measure. In that case,
one is tempted to ask - if the measures available in this data set do not describe cooperative
success, what does? Given the data available, it is not clear how these questions can be pursued
in this study, although they are certainly interesting topics for additional research.
Conclusion
Cooperatives today face an increasingly challenging situation. Competition with
investor-owned agribusinesses and the increasing size and sophistication of members combine to
make cooperative decisions much more important. While many studies have considered the
policies that cooperatives pursue, few have examined the influence of member characteristics and
market conditions on these policies. Using a survey of marketing cooperatives, this study
examines the relationship between member characteristics and the cooperative's pricing policy.
It appears that the data offers some support for the predictions regarding pricing policy
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given above. Interestingly, the age and tenure of members seems to have no effect on the
cooperative's pricing policy. This may be because coop members are often incorporated farms
rather than individuals, and the membership goes with the farm instead of the individual. In the
pricing policy regression equations, the presence of tradeable delivery rights tied to investment
significantly increases the probability that the cooperative will have retained earnings. The
results on cooperative size are mixed. Increased sales may reduce the likelihood of the
cooperative having a longer-term pricing policy, but more members increases this probability. It
will be important in future research to disentangle these two effects.
The second objective of this study is to explore the tie between member characteristics,
pricing policies and cooperative success. It is posited that cooperatives with a good fit between
characteristics and policies are more successful. Several measures of success are defined, and
then regressed on characteristics of the membership and the pricing policy the cooperative uses.
The regressors appear to explain only the self-reported measures of cooperative success. This
may be due to problems in defining and measuring cooperative success, or to the many factors
influencing success that are not included in the data set. However, given the number and variety
of dependent variables used, it appears that determining which of these explanations is
appropriate will not be possible with these data. However, these results do suggest that defining
useful measures of cooperative success, and/or determining which factors best predict it would
be an interesting future study.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Item (regression variable name)

Effect on
Pricing Policy

Response

Member Characteristics
Age of Members (page20, page31 ,
page41,pageSl,page61)

older - at cost

20-30 years = 5%
31-40 years = 17%
41-50 years = 30%
51-60 years = 32%
61-70 years = 320/0
over 70 years = 3%

Length of Patronage4 (pctll 0, pct1120,
pct2130, pct3140)

?

0-10 years = 34%
11-20 years = 36%
21-30 years = 23%
31-40 years = 10%
more than 40 years = 15%

Percentage of Members Who Have
Patronized the Cooperative its Entire
ExistenceS

larger - max
TC or w

mean=21 %
median=O%
mode=O%

Member Income from Cooperative
(mbrinc)

larger - max
TC or w

less than $60,000 = 51 %
$60,000 to $119,999 = 17%
$120,000 to $199,999 = 10%
$200,000 to $499,999 = 11 %
$500,000 or more = 11 %

Source of Majority of Member Income
(misrc)

Co-op - max
TC or w

Cooperative = 54%
Another Source = 35%
No Response = 10%

4Percentages for this and member age sum to over 100 because the average of each category was calculated.
SThis variable was not included in the regressions because it is a linear combination of coopage and
member length of patronage.
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Item (regression variable name)

Effect on
Pricing Policy

Response

Cooperative Structure/Characteristics
Age of Cooperative (coop age)

older - max n
or w

mean = 52 yr, median = 50 yr
mode = 50 yr

Number of Members (mbrno)

?

mean = 613 median = 69
mode = 30

Total Sales Last Fiscal Year (coopsale)

?

less than $5 million = 53%
$5 to $25 million = 230/0
$26 to $50 million = 6%
$51 to $100 million = 8%
$101 to $250 million = 3%
more than $250 million = 7%

Cooperative Structure (federated)

federated max n orw

federated = 8%
mixed = 6%
centralized = 86%

Changes in Membership (growth)

Presence of Tradeable Delivery Rights

(tdr)

.
.
IncreasIng,
closed - max
n orw

yes - max
orw

n

increasing = 22%
decreasing = 36%
steady = 39%
closed = 3%
yes = 3% no = 970/0

Cooperative Control over Members
yes - max n
orw

yes = 39% no = 610/0

(mgtexp)
Can Management Impose a Monetary
Penalty on Members (mgtpenal)

yes - max n
orw

yes = 35% no = 65%

Voting Restrictions (voting)

yes - max n
orw

yes = 67% no = 33%

Retired Member Participation (retvote)

yes - at cost

yes = 16%) no = 840/0

Are Delivery Rights Tied to Investment

(tiedrigh t)

yes - max n
or w

yes = 11 % no = 77%
no response = 12 %

Percentage of Non-Member Business the
Cooperative Handles (pctnmbr)

higher - max
n or w

mean = 8%
median = 0%

Can Management Expel Members
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Item (regression variable name)

Effect on
Pricing Policy

Response

Pricing Strategy and Success Measures

Pricing Strategy

low initial, high retains = 2%
competitive initial, median
retains = 42%
high initial, low retains = 210/0
full pymt at time of sale = 35%

Equity Redemption Plan6

revolving fund = 760/0
base capital = 140/0
percent of all equity = 6%
redeemed to estate = 24%
redeemed to age = 14%
other = 6%

Co-op Success - Sales per Member

mean = $506,516
median = $93,750

Co-op Success - Profitability7

0=2% 1 = 8% 2 = 23%
3 = 39% 4 = 28%

Co-op Success - Financial Stability

o= 1%

Co-op Success - Member Satisfaction

o = 20/0

Co-op Success - Expansion in Existing
Areas

yes = 440/0 no = 56%

Co-op Success - Expansion to New
Areas

yes = 250/0 no = 750/0

Co-op Success - Reduced Workforce

yes = 29% no = 710/0

1 = 5% 2 = 15%
3 = 35% 4 = 44%

1 = 1% 2 = 17%
3 = 480/0 4 = 320/0

6Percentages are of those cooperatives with an equity redemption plan in place. (n=70) Sums to more than
100% because some cooperatives have more than one plan in place.
7The

next three questions are self-reported. O=poor to 4=very good .

24
Table 2: Probit regression: dependent variable = pricing/retains policy
Variable

retstrat

m. effect

intercept

-5.32
(7.33)
-14.75t
(8.42)
3.64
(6.13)
-1.85
(6.11)
3.73
(6.45)
-2.80
(8.07)
-.28
(.80)
-2.47
(1.59)
1.17t
(.66)
-1.67*
(.86)
-1.33t
(.78)
.32
(.27)
1.93**
(.58)
-.92**
(.37)

-1.78
(2.27)
-4.66*
(2.45)
1.15
(1.91)
-.58
(1.93)
1.18
(2.01)
-.89
(2.53)
-.09
(.25)
-.78t
(.46)
.37t
0·2
-.53*
(.25)
-.42t
(.24)
.10
(.08)
.61 **
(.15)
-.29**
(.09)

page20 - Percent of members age 20 to 30
page3l - Percent of members age 31 to 40
page41 - Percent of members age 41 to 50
page51 - Percent of members age 51 to 60
page61 - Percent of members age 61 to 70
retvote - 1 if retired members are allowed to vote
federate - 1= federated or mixed, 0 = centralized
tdr - 2 = allowed, 1 = not allowed, 0 =
membership is closed
mincsrc - 1 if majority of member's income is
from business with coop, 0 if not
growth - 1 if membership is increasing or closed, 0
if decreasing or steady
mbrinc - categories of member income, 1=lowest
to 5=highest
mbmoc - number of members divided into
quintiles 1=smallest to 5=largest
coopsales - categories of coop yearly sales
1=lowest to 6=highest
csale 1 - 1 = sales less than $5 million
csale2 - 1 = sales between $5 and $25 million
csale3 - 1 = sales between $26 and $50 n1illion
csale4 - 1 = sales between $51 and $100 million
csale5# - 1 = sales between $101 and $250 million
csale6 - 1 = sales over $250 million

sale
dummies
-23.395
(209943)
-21.02t
(11.87)
4.41
(7.77)
-4.4
(7.91)
9.25
(8.47)
-7.41
(10.97)
-.07
(.86)
-2.75t
(1.67)
1.03
(.66)
-1.99*
(1.00)
-1.67t
(.92)
.27
(.28)
2.62**
(.94)

10.37
(209943)
8.9
(209943)
5.37
(209943)
1.10
(209943)
5.56
(209943)
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Variable

retstrat

m. effect

decage - Number of decades coop has been in
existence
tiedright - 1 if deli very rights are tied to
investment, 0 if not
voting - 1 if members must be present to vote, 0 if
not
mgtexp - 1 if management can expel members, 0 if
not
mgtpenal - 1 if management can penalize
members, 0 if not
pctnonmbr - Percentage of revenue from nonmembers
pctI10 - Percent of members with coop less than
10 years
pctI120 - Percent of members with coop 11 to 20
years
pct2130 - Percent of members with coop 21 to 30
years
pct3140 - Percent of members with coop 31 to 40
years
Restricted Ln Likelihood
Ln Likelihood
Percent Correctl:y Predicted

-.02
(.17)
5.66**
(2.11 )
.14
(.57)
.69
(.76)
-.69
(.76)
.27
(2.01)
4.41
(3.39)
-.45
(2.34)
-1.76
(2.37)
-2.95
(3.54)
-43.86
-21.75
810/0

-.005
(.05)
1.79**
(.57)
.04
(.18)
.22
(.24)
-.22
(.24)
.08
(.64)
1.39
(.99)
-.14
(.74)
-.55
(.75)
-.93
(1.15)

#csale5 is omitted from all regressions, as it perfectly predicts retstrat
Standard errors given in parentheses
t = significant at 10%
* = significant at 5%

**=significant at 1%

sale
dummies
.09
(.20)
9.00**
(3.58)
-.08
(.71)
1.59t
(.97)
-.79
(1.00)
-.13
(1.83)
9.74*
(4.97)
4.76
(3.94)
.82
(2.9)
-.65
(4.02)
-43 .86
-19.97
84%
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Table 3: Relationship Between Pricing/retains Strategies and Success
Pricing Strategy

Success Measure

Pricing Strategy

Success Measure

Expansion into
new area

Reduction in
Workforce

yes

no

yes

no

High initial price,
limited retains

270/0
(7)

73%
(19)

High initial price,
limi ted retains

35%)
(9)

65%)
(17)

Payment upon sale of
output

22%
(10)

78%
(36)

Payment upon sale
of output

23%
(11)

770/0
(36)

Low initial price,
high retains

33%
(1)

67%
(2)

Low initial price,
high retains

0%

100%
(3)

Competitive initial
price, median retains

280/0
(15)

72%
(38)

Competitive initial
price, median retains

32%
(17)

680/0
(36)

Pricing Strategy

Sales per Member

Expansion in
Existing Area
yes

no

High initial price,
limi ted retains

48%
(12)

52%
(13)

Payment upon sale of
output

47%
(21)

53%
(24)

Low initial price,
high retains

67%
(2)

Competitive initial
price, median retains

42%
(22)

Average

Median

High initial price,
limi ted retains

925,472

83,333

33%
(1)

Payment upon sale
of output

522,373

208,333

580/0
(31)

Low initial price,
high retains

152,985

96,154

Competitive initial
price, median retains

418,719

76,076

Retains Strategy

Sales per Member
A verage

Median

Retains Kept

404,484

92,593

No Retains

669,987

116,923
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Abstract
Cooperatives are unique among agribusiness firms because their owners are also their customers.
This dual nature of patrons means that maximizing profit is one of several optimal strategies the
cooperative may pursue. Using a survey of marketing cooperative managers, we examine how
membership characteristics and cooperative structure influence cooperative policies. We also
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maximization more likely. Cooperative success does not appear systematically related to
membership characteristics or cooperative structure. Evidently, cooperative success is not easily
measured or explained. JEL Codes: L120, Q130, L200
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Introduction
Cooperatives face many challenges in today's agricultural market. They must compete
horizontally with increasingly large investor-owned firms (IOFs) and often must sell their
products in markets where only a few extremely large firms act as buyers. Both processing and
supply cooperatives are called on to make ever larger investments in capital to serve their diverse
member-owners. The size distribution of U.S. farms illustrates the difficulties cooperatives face
in meeting the needs of a diverse membership while making business decisions necessary to
remain competitive. The 1997 Census of Agriculture reports that only 7% of all the farms in the
United States produced over 70% of the value of agricultural products sold in 1997 while
approximately 740/0 of all the farms in the U.S. produced only about 6.8% of the value of
agricultural products sold the same year. Since many cooperatives need assured supplies to
operate processing facilities efficiently they need to maintain the commitment of large farmers
while still serving the needs of smaller producers.
Cooperatives have been successful because they have met the needs of their
member-owners. In the past these needs were usually geography-specific and cooperatives were
organized to market local products and/or provide agricultural inputs on a local basis. Because
members were located in the same region, they were generally homogeneous and cooperative
policies were easier to specify. As the structure of cooperatives has evolved to larger, less
geographically dependent organizations, interest in issues of member commitment, control and
governance has intensified. The characteristics of owner-members have also changed as
commercial farm size has increased and sophisticated management systems have emerged. This
has resulted in a more diverse (heterogeneous) membership within cooperatives. As a result, the

-2-

